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Abstract 
 
 In recent years, there has been a debate over whether public companies should be 
required to have either a mandatory retention period or a mandatory rotation period for 
their external auditors. With all of the financial scandals that occurred in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, the idea of auditor switching has come to the forefront. There are some 
opponents to auditor switching when companies switch auditors due to opinion shopping. 
However, research has identified many other reasons for switching auditors, such as 
business growth or requirements for new audit procedures. When companies require 
more complex audits, it may become necessary to choose a different auditor. When faced 
with the decision to choose a new auditor, more often than not, a company will choose a 
Big Four firm. I collected research on 17 different companies that experienced corporate 
fraud and analyzed the company’s decision to switch auditors. I found that in many cases 
the company decided to switch to one of the Big Four firms, and in a few cases, the 
company retained its original auditor.  
 
Introduction  
When faced with litigation or criticism, it is likely that a company will switch 
auditors, either out of dissatisfaction with the former auditor or because litigation against 
the auditor results in a situation where the auditor is no longer independent of the 
company and can no longer conduct the audit. My paper examines companies’ decisions 
to retain or switch auditors following corporate fraud. I find that large companies that 
already use a Big Four firm are most likely going to stick with a Big Four firm rather than 
switch to a smaller firm.  
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Evidence. 
I researched Press Releases on the Securities and Exchange Commission website 
for all instances of fraud that experienced litigation and selected seventeen cases to 
analyze. I then looked at each company’s annual SEC filings (10-K) to see who the 
external auditor was prior to the fraud and who the external auditor was after the fraud. 
All the press releases were from 2005 to 2011, but the fraud occurred as early as 1994. 
Table 1 on page 26 summarizes my sample.  
 
The following cases are those of companies using smaller (non-Big Four) auditors:  
 
1. Koss Corporation  
In 2010, Koss Corporation sued Grant Thornton for failing to find an alleged $31 
million fraud committed by the Company’s Vice President of Finance over a period of 
five years. Companies blame their auditors because they believe auditors should detect 
the fraud. Indeed the auditor does have the ability to conduct various tests for detecting 
fraud, however at times it is not the responsibility of the independent external auditor to 
perform such tests. In fact in the audit opinion, Grant Thornton stated, “The Company is 
not required to have, nor were we engaged to perform an audit of its internal control over 
financial reporting,” because Koss was too small to fall under the internal control 
reporting requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Koss 
Corporation could have hired Grant Thornton to review internal controls and perform 
procedures that are specifically designed to detect fraud, but did not do so. Koss 
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Corporation ultimately decided to switch independent external auditors to a smaller firm, 
Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP. Koss is one of only two instances in my sample where 
the company switched to a smaller tier accounting firm.  
 
2. DHB Industries Inc.  
In February 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Florida-
based DHB Industries Inc., the maker of body armor used by U.S. combat troops, was 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting by its senior officers and also, assets were 
misappropriated to personally benefit the CEO. The fraudulent activity resulted in the 
filing of materially false and misleading periodic reports to investors. The directors of the 
company were criticized for their willful blindness to red flags allowing senior 
management to manipulate key financial figures and public filings between 2003 and 
2005. Grant Thornton was the auditor for DHB and resigned the engagement after they 
found the company failed to disclose s transaction valued at more than $7 million. 
UNITE, an apparels and textiles union, filed three letters of complaint claiming the 
company violated federal securities rules requiring disclosure of information to investors. 
After Grant Thornton quit, DHB had to hire a new auditor to perform their audit. In this 
case, the company went from the 6th largest firm to a smaller mid-size firm, Weiser LLP. 
The company claimed they switched because they believed that the smaller firm would 
perform higher quality audits and would be more committed to follow through with their 
engagement. It is evident that Grant Thornton was more concerned with their reputation 
than completing the engagement.   
 
 5 
3. China Intelligent Lighting and Electronics Inc. (CIL) 
A similar situation where the accounting firm quit prior to completing the 
engagement was China Intelligent Lighting and Electronics Inc. (CIL). MaloneBailey 
LLP, CIL’s independent auditor, resigned and withdrew its audit opinions on the 
financial statements included in the companies’ registration statements. The company 
hired Friedman LLP, a mid-sized firm, to perform an audit of the 2010 and 2011 financial 
statements to test for material deficiencies. MaloneBailey LLP is a very small firm and 
the allegations the firm has made against this company are being carefully considered. 
According to these allegations, the company is not in compliance with Amex listing 
standards and is now subject to delisting. The PCAOB is currently conducting an 
investigation of the accounting firm to ensure audit deliverables were professional and 
the auditors exercised due care.  
 
4. City of San Diego 
In 2002 and 2003, the accounting firm Calderon, Jaham & Osborn, which was the 
independent auditor for the City of San Diego, issued unqualified audit reports when they 
contained materially false and misleading information about San Diego’s pension and 
retiree health care obligations. The city was criticized for hiring a firm with inadequate 
technical skills, experience and resources to conduct proper audits and hiring the auditor 
with the lowest bid, rather than the critical factors necessary. The city of San Diego 
switched from Calderon, Jaham & Osborn, a firm with approximately 30 employees, to 
Macias Gini &O’Connell LLP, a firm with over 230 professionals. This supports the idea 
that larger firms, with more resources and people, will provide a better quality audit than 
 6 
a smaller firm. Cities of this size require a larger firm in order to perform the tests and 
procedures necessary to provide their constituents with accurate information.  
* * * * 
In 2007, the SEC found sixty-nine different audit firms and partners that issued 
reports but were not registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). One of the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is to be registered 
with the PCAOB in order to prepare and issue audit reports on the financial statements of 
public companies. Companies typically hire smaller firms because of the smaller audit 
fees; however, in this case, these public companies risked not fulfilling the requirement 
of obtaining an independent accountant’s opinion from a registered public accounting 
firm. Companies can trust that the larger accounting firms will have certified public 
accountants on the audit engagement and will be a registered accounting firm.  
 
 
The following cases are those companies that decided not to switch auditors following 
litigation: 
 
5. American International Group, Inc. (AIG) 
In 2004, The SEC charged the American International Group, Inc. (AIG) with 
securities fraud. AIG’s reinsurance transactions with General Re Corporation (Gen Re) 
were designed to falsely inflate AIG’s loss reserves by $500 million. There were 
additional transactions in which AIG materially misstated its financial results through 
sham transactions and entities created for the purpose of misleading the investing public. 
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AIG admitted in its restatement that certain transactions may have “involved 
documentation that did not accurately reflect the true nature of the arrangements and 
misrepresentations to members of management, regulators and AIG’s independent 
auditors.”1 The fraudulent transactions took place between December 2000 and March 
2001. The independent auditor that was responsible for auditing AIG’s financial 
statements during this time was Coopers and Lybrand, LLP. While the company was 
required to restate their financial statements, AIG continued to use the same auditing firm 
in the years to follow because the fraud was committed over a short period of time, and 
hence might not reflect unfavorably on the quality of the audit.   
 
6. Kmart 
A critical portion of the 10-K and 10-Q filings is the section entitled 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis. In the case of Kmart, the executives failed to 
acknowledge the reasons for a massive inventory overbuy in 2001. This misled investors 
about Kmart’s financial condition in the months preceding the company’s bankruptcy. 
The lies eventually caught up to the executives and they faced charges of financial fraud. 
This reaffirms the importance of all information contained in documents that include 
audited financial statements.   
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers was the auditor throughout Kmart’s bankruptcy and Kmart 
chose to stick with PwC.  
 
                                                
1 "AIG to Pay $800 Million to Settle Securities Fraud Charges by SEC." ; Press Release No. 2006-19; 
February 9, 2006. 09 Feb. 2006. Web. 26 Mar. 2012. <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-19.htm>. 
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7.  Enterasys Network Systems, Inc.  
From 2000 to 2001, Enterasys Network Systems, Inc. inflated revenue to increase 
the price of its stock. The company improperly recognized revenue for sales transactions 
with a right of return. The company also entered into “swapping” arrangements, where 
they exchanged products or services without having a legitimate business purpose for 
doing so and recognized revenue on these exchanges. The company overstated its 
revenue by over $11 million in the quarter ending September 1, 2001. KPMG was the 
independent auditor of Enterasys during this time and the company decided to not switch 
auditors. 
 
The following are those cases that switched from Big-Four firms to another Big-Four 
firm:  
 
8. Delphi Corporation  
The SEC filed financial fraud charges against Delphi Corporation, the auto parts 
supplier, for engaging in fraudulent activities between 2000 and 2004. Delphi engaged in 
multiple schemes that resulted in Delphi materially misstating it financial condition and 
operating results in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, offering 
documents, press releases, and other documents and statements. The independent auditor 
during this time was Deloitte and Touche and after the investigation the company 
switched to Ernst and Young in 2006.  
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9. Xerox 
From 1997 through 2000, Xerox Corp. was engaged in a fraudulent scheme that 
misled investors about Xerox’s earnings in order to improve its reputation on Wall Street 
and to boost the company’s stock price. It was alleged that the fraudulent conduct was 
responsible for accelerating the recognition of equipment revenues of approximately $3 
billion and increasing pre-tax earnings by $1.4 billion in Xerox’s 1997-2000 financial 
results. KPMG LLP, the former independent auditor of Xerox, was charged for its 
connection with the audits of Xerox Corp. The SEC found that KPMG permitted Xerox 
to manipulate its accounting practices to close a $3 billion “gap” between actual 
operating results and results reported to the investing public. Prior to the SEC’s 
investigation, KPMG did not raise any concerns to Xerox’s management about the illegal 
acts that had occurred (even when they had information about these illegal acts). 
Moreover, when Xerox ignored KPMG’s request to perform more tests on the financial 
statements, KPMG never put any pressure on Xerox to follow their guidance and 
instructions. This case clearly indicates poor audit quality and a lack of professionalism 
by a Big Four Firm. Xerox hired another Big-Four Firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, as the 
new independent auditor.  
 
10. Satayam Computer Services  
In 2011, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) also experienced a major lawsuit. It was 
found that five India-based affiliates of PwC, known as PW India Affiliates, conducted 
deficient audits of Satyam Computer Services Limited financial statements. These 
deficient audits enabled a massive accounting fraud to go undetected for several years. 
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The SEC determined that PW India failed to conduct fundamental audit procedures. PW 
India did not conduct proper audits and failed exercise professional skepticism and due 
care. The accounting firm failed to confirm Satyam’s cash and cash equivalent balances 
or its accounts receivables. This failure to properly execute third-party confirmation 
procedures is what enabled the fraud at Satyam to go undetected. This is a clear portrayal 
of an audit quality failure from a Big-Four firm. As a result of this case, PW India 
replaced all senior management responsible and suspended its Satyam audit engagement 
partners. PwC was given a $6 million penalty. While the case is still being settled, 
Satyam Computer Services Limited has switched audit firms to another Big Four firm, 
Deloitte & Touche. 
  
11. Nortel Network Limited  
Nortel Networks Limited (Nortel) engaged in an accounting fraud from 2000 
through 2003. The company made changes to its revenue recognition policies that 
fraudulently accelerated revenue to meet its revenue targets. It also selectively reversed 
certain revenue entries. Ultimately, the company inflated its 2000 revenues by 
approximately $1.4 billion. Once these fraudulent acts were placed in motion, the 
following years maintained these numbers and effectively continued the fraud for four 
years. Deloitte & Touche LLP had been the independent auditor but eventually Deloitte 
was phased out and currently Nortel uses KPMG as their independent auditor.  
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12. Just for Feet  
The failure of an auditor to deliver quality services can result in the failure of the 
auditor’s client. The failure to detect discrepancies can enable a fraud to continue longer. 
This is the case for the company Just for Feet, Inc. Deloitte & Touche failed to 
adequately test the financial statements, and the partners involved on the audit were 
found to have performed their audit with improper professional conduct. They should 
have reasonably known that Just for Feet’s 1998 financial statements had not been in 
accordance with GAAP. Deloitte’s National risk management program had identified Just 
for Feet, Inc. as a high-risk client, but the partners on the engagement did not carry out 
the proper tests that should have been performed on such a risky client. Eventually, the 
company went bankrupt and was acquired by Foodstar Inc., which uses KPMG LLP as 
their independent auditor.  
 
13. Adelphia Communications  
Deloitte & Touche was charged with another case in which the engagement team 
failed to deliver quality audits. Adelphia Communications Corporation perpetrated a 
massive fraud and Deloitte’s team failed to implement audit procedures designed to 
detect the illegal acts that surfaced. As with Just for Feet, Inc., Deloitte identified 
Adelphia as a high-risk client but failed to design an audit appropriately tailored to 
address those audit risk areas. During the fiscal year 2000, Adelphia improperly excluded 
$1.6 billion in debt from its balance sheet, failed to disclose significant related party 
transactions and overstated its stockholders’ equity by $375 million. As a result, Deloitte 
agreed to substantive undertakings to increase the training of Deloitte’s audit 
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professionals in fraud detection and increase partner involvement in the audits. Adelphia 
Communications Corporation ultimately decided to switch auditors to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.  
 
14. Cardinal Health, Inc.   
Cardinal Health, Inc., a pharmaceutical distribution company, engaged in a 
fraudulent revenue and earnings management scheme from September 2000 through 
March 2004. The litigation found that the company materially overstated its operating 
revenue, earnings and growth trends. The company misclassified more than $5 billion of 
bulk sales as operating revenue. The company also failed to disclose the impact of the 
change from applying the last-in-first-out (LIFO) inventory valuation method. On the 
2007 10-K, the legal proceedings mentioned that the company’s external auditors 
Deloitte & Touche, would possibly be charged with the misstatements of the financial 
statements, but this case was later dismissed. Deloitte failed to find the fraudulent 
schemes for four years of financial statements and the company decided to switch to 
Ernst & Young, LLP.  
 
The following are the Arthur Anderson cases (which was considered a “Big-Five” firm). 
The collapse of Arthur Anderson is an excellent portrayal of how a large professional 
services firm can fail. 
 
 
 
 13 
15. United Health Group  
As UnitedHealth Group’s auditors, Arthur Anderson LLP failed to find fraud. The 
CEO was secretly backdating stock options to obtain undeserved compensation. During 
the years between 1994 and 2005, he picked grant dates for UnitedHealth options that 
coincided with dates of low quarterly closing prices so that the grants would be priced at 
in-the-money options. The company ended up having to restate all of its financial 
statements for each year from 1994 through 2005. They disclosed material errors that 
totaled $1.526 billion for that period. After this fraud was disclosed, Deloitte & Touche 
LLP was hired to take over the independent audits.  
 
16. Freddie Mac 
One of the largest fraud scandals was that of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Freddie Mac improperly reported its earnings for the years 
between 1998 and 2002. The company improperly used derivatives to shift earnings 
between periods, which resulted in misreporting its net income in 2000, 2001, and 2002 
by 30.5 percent, 23.9 percent and 42.9 percent, respectively. In an investigation by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the independent auditor in 2002, PwC found various warning 
signs in the Management Assessment Risk and Controls (MARC) self-assessment 
reports. The information in the reports indicated that Freddie Mac had inadequate 
accounting personnel and expertise, and the shortages of staff and expertise caused 
serious deficiencies in crucial control areas. All of the warning signs identified were signs 
that Arthur Anderson LLP, the former independent auditor, should have discovered. The 
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company switched to PricewaterhouseCoopers after Arthur Anderson collapsed in the 
wake of the Enron Scandal.  
 
17. Nicor Inc.  
From 1999 to 2002, Nicor, Inc. executives were engaged in a financial fraud that 
misrepresented inventory balances to reach certain financial targets and increase the 
company’s revenues. In connection with the company’s adoption of LIFO to account for 
inventory, the company officers approved improper transactions and allowed material 
misrepresentations in the financial statements. They also failed to disclose the effects of 
LIFO in the financial statements. During these years, Arthur Anderson LLP was 
responsible for the audit. The company switched to Deloitte & Touche LLP.  
 
Limitations. 
 There are no private companies included in this study. Financial and auditor 
information about private companies are not publicly disclosed and thus difficult to 
obtain. Also, any material misstatements that did not result in litigation are not included 
in this study. Most companies that are publicly traded are large companies and use Big-
Four auditors. I attempted to find a mix of small and large companies in this study.  
 
Discussion of Findings. 
Based on the above-mentioned cases, I find that when faced with fraud, if a 
company is not already using a Big Four firm, the company is more likely to hire a larger 
accounting firm to conduct future audits of their financial statements.  
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There were two such cases in which that did not occur. The first was Koss. Grant 
Thornton failed to find a $31 million fraud and the company sued Grant Thornton and 
switched to a smaller firm. With the size and time-span of this fraud, it is easy to accuse 
the independent auditors. Because companies are apt to blame someone other than their 
own management, it can be difficult to measure audit quality by the number of lawsuits a 
firm may be associated with. This case supports the “Deep Pockets Theory” (Dye, 1993), 
which implies that litigation is a poor signal of audit quality. I will discuss the deep 
pockets theory in greater detail later. In this case, Koss is attempting to blame Grant 
Thornton because they know that Grant Thornton has the ability to pay legal damages.  
 
The second case was DHB Industries Inc., which switched to a smaller auditor 
after their former auditor, Grant Thornton, resigned and retracted their audit opinion. The 
company criticized Grant Thornton for not exhibiting professionalism and following 
through with their engagement. In the two instances where the company switched 
auditors to a smaller firm, Grant Thornton was a common factor. This could suggest that 
Grant Thornton does not consistently deliver high-quality audits.  
 
The other smaller companies typically went from a small accounting firm to a 
larger, more reliable firm to conduct future audits. In the third case (CIL), the smaller 
audit firm retracted its opinion and resigned, expressing that there was fraudulent 
behavior within the company. The investigation of that company is ongoing so the 
company hired a larger firm to audit the financial statements. In the meantime, the 
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PCAOB investigated the smaller firm to ensure they are actually delivering quality audit 
services.  
 
There were a few companies in the sample that chose to not switch auditors. The 
reason for this can be explained by the high switching costs associated with changing 
auditors. This theory will be explained more thoroughly in the next section of the thesis. 
Another reason for these companies choosing not to switch auditors is the span of time of 
the fraud. These three cases happened to have the shortest time-span of fraud so the 
company may have been satisfied with the audit quality of the firm.  
 
The results of my sample suggest a commonality of switching to larger firms in 
the case of litigation and criticism. Larger firms have better reputations and are more 
credible than smaller firms. Smaller public companies that go with the lowest audit fees 
could end up with more trouble in their company by not catching fraud. Fraudulent 
actions might be more readily detected if the company were to invest more in the audit 
fees and hire the auditor to issue special opinions on internal control; however, it is not 
safe to assume that all controls will be tested just because the company uses a larger firm. 
As in the case of Koss, the company assumed that Grant Thornton tested all internal 
controls when in the financial statements the engagement auditors specifically stated they 
did not test internal controls. The responsibility of the auditor is to uphold a sense of 
professionalism and due care when performing an audit. When aspects of the audit 
become skeptical to the client, the client’s choice to keep or change auditors is a sign of 
the audit firm’s quality.  
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Literature Review and Theory 
 In this section, I will discuss the theoretical research related to auditor reputation, 
auditor wealth, audit fees, and the impact of auditor switching.  
 
 During the late 1970’s, regulators and small audit firms believed that the size of 
the audit firm did not affect audit quality. There is some criticism that the large 
accounting firms should not be arbitrarily distinguished from all the other CPA firms. 
Some described this as a “discriminatory impact” on smaller firms (DeAngelo, 1981). In 
1978, there was a lawsuit filed by 18 small and medium-sized audit firms arguing to 
break the division of the AICPA into two practice sections. One practice section included 
those audit firms whose clients include companies that are required to file reports with 
the SEC, and the other practice section consisted of audit firms with only nonpublic 
company audit clients. Although the case was dismissed, the reaction to the suit was to 
establish a committee, the Derieux Committee, to evaluate this correlation between audit 
size and audit quality. The committee expressed concern that smaller accounting firms 
were losing audit clients because they were less well known, even though the smaller 
firms provided high or higher quality services (DeAngelo, 1981). There were several 
studies that contradicted this argument of “discriminatory impact” on the smaller firms 
and that provided evidence that larger firms do in fact provide higher quality. 
 
 DeAngelo (1981) argues that consumers can use size as a measure of audit 
quality. DeAngelo defines quality of audit services as “the market-assessed joint 
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probability that the given auditor will both discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system and report the breach.” The ability to discover a breach depends primarily on the 
auditor’s technological capabilities, the audit procedures and the extent of sampling. If it 
is found that any one of those factors is inadequate, an audit failure could occur. Auditor 
independence is the factor pertaining to the auditor’s willingness to report the breach 
after discovery. For instance, if the auditor has incentives to not disclose certain aspects 
of the clients financials that should be reported, the auditor fails to be independent of the 
client. In 1977, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell stated, “the single largest audit fee comprises 
only ½% of their total revenues” (DeAngelo, 1981). For smaller firms, fees from a single 
large client may hinder the quality of the audit.  
 
DeAngelo’s research focused on the idea that large auditors issue more accurate 
reports because they have “more to lose” from damage to their reputations. An alternative 
to this reputation theory is the “Deep Pockets Theory.” This theory asserts that auditors 
with more wealth at risk from litigation have more incentive to issue accurate reports. 
Dye makes the claim that litigation is a poor signal of audit accuracy (Dye, 1993). Large 
auditors have more wealth at risk from litigation and thus have more incentives to issue 
accurate reports. The amount of wealth can factor into the result of the lawsuit and the 
size of the litigation penalty. Large auditors receive more criticism and are more prone to 
litigation but still maintain strong demand for their services. DeAngelo’s argument 
suggests that larger auditors should receive less criticism than smaller auditors but later 
research supports Dye’s deep pockets theory.  
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Further evaluation into these two theories was made by Lennox (1999). This 
study measured audit quality in terms of Type I and Type II errors, assuming that auditors 
are sued for Type I errors, issuing a negative report when it should have issued a “clean” 
report. The author explains that litigation is a weak sign of audit quality because large 
auditors are more likely to be sued for Type I errors because of their “deep pockets.” The 
author made the assertion that a company would hire a large auditor if they expected a 
“clean” report because larger firms are more credible. Lennox models the owner’s 
expected payoff as the company’s expected selling price minus the audit fee. A more 
credible firm will have greater influence on the company’s selling price. The findings 
showed that the two firms with the greatest number of lawsuits (the most criticized firms) 
were Ernst & Young and a mid-sized firm. In comparison to the other large and mid-
sized firms, the two firms suffered more losses in clients and in growth than the others 
categorized by size.  
 
Audit Quality and Audit Fees 
 Companies can experience high start-up costs when hiring a new auditor. By 
working on the same clients for a period of years, auditors can earn client-specific quasi-
rents that can serve as collateral against opportunistic behavior. Larger auditors have 
“more to lose” from supplying a lower-than promised level of audit quality and thus have 
a higher perceived audit quality. DeAngelo also argues that the difference in agency costs 
indicate a differing “level” of audit quality. A complex audit may be required for a larger 
client or a client with more complicated accounting procedures, and thus demand a 
certain type of auditor to deliver the services required.   
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 There are several challenges to the correlation of audit fees and audit quality. 
First, the total fees will clearly be larger for a larger firm because bigger clients will 
purchase more services than smaller clients. Auditors may also be contracted to provide 
special reports and/or opinions in addition to general external audits of financial 
statements. Audit fees can vary with these additional reports (Palmrose, 1986). Audit fees 
can also be affected by location and the coordination and complexity of an engagement. 
For instance, if the client has multiple locations that require on-site visits, the audit fees 
will be higher. In many cases, an auditor will rely on the client’s inputs or utilize client 
personnel for some audit tasks. The audit fees are reduced by any of these client inputs. 
The client’s industry can also affect audit fees by measuring differences in risk. Audit 
fees are also generally higher among companies with public ownership. Companies with 
public ownership are at a greater exposure to risk and require more audit evidence. If 
there are any report modifications, the auditor is required to accumulate a greater amount 
of evidence to achieve the same quality, which results in more billable hours and higher 
audit fees (Arens & Loebbecke, 1997). All of these variables can attribute to the 
difference in fees between a small and large firm; thus it is difficult to determine if audit 
firms with higher fees provide higher audit quality. This is the reason for my focus on 
auditor switching rather than audit fees.  
 
Audit Quality and Auditor Switching  
In the case of switching auditors, the transaction costs of changing auditors often 
make it unprofitable to do so. This relationship creates a “bilateral monopoly” because 
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the resignation of the auditor would impose costs for both the auditor and the client. The 
auditor would lose the benefits of the client-specific quasi-rents and the client would bear 
transaction costs and start-up expenses for the new auditor. Incumbent auditors have the 
ability to keep raising fees without making it profitable for clients to actually switch 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Agency theory suggests that a switch may also signal unfavorable 
news to investors and companies have more incentive to avoid signaling unfavorable 
news when agency costs are high (Fried and Schiff, 1981). This may help explain why 
some companies in my sample chose to keep their auditors even after they had to restate 
their financial statements. Since the issue was not over a particularly long time frame, the 
client was satisfied enough to retain its auditors.  
 
There are other reasons for switching auditors. It was found that failing 
companies were more likely to switch auditors than non-failing companies. Companies 
that receive a qualified report are also more likely to switch (Lennox, 1999). Previous 
studies have also shown the effect of accounting disputes on a firm’s choice of auditors. 
Burton and Roberts (1967) sampled 83 auditor switches made by Fortune 500 firms 
between 1952 and 1965 and found that companies switched auditors due to accounting 
disputes, the demand for additional services, changes in management and more 
specifications due to new financing. Chow and Rice (1982) tested whether the firms 
switched auditors after receiving qualified opinions by dividing public companies into 
four categories: receiving a qualified opinion and switching auditors, receiving a clean 
opinion and switching auditors, receiving a qualified opinion and keeping the same 
auditor, and receiving a clean opinion and keeping the same auditor. Findings showed 
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that firms tend to switch auditors after receiving a qualified opinion. In addition, 
companies that switch firms do not typically switch to smaller firms. However, switching 
auditors after receiving a qualified opinion does not increase the probability of receiving 
a clean opinion in the following year. 
 
Becker et. al. measures audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals. The 
idea behind this study was that non Big-Six auditors allow more income-increasing 
earnings management than Big Six auditors. Managers have incentives to adjust earnings 
to maximize firm and manager wealth. Incentives can be created by contracts that are 
explicitly based on reported earnings (i.e., management compensation plans and debt 
agreements), and contracts implicitly based on reported earnings (i.e., implicit contracts 
between firms and its customer or suppliers). These opportunities are constrained by 
discretionary accruals, the “accounting flexibility” or the level of variation the auditor 
allows. Companies using non-Big Six auditors have significantly larger variation than 
companies with big six auditors. Defond and Subramanyam (1998) describes three 
implications of auditor switching and discretionary accruals. First, the predecessor 
auditor prefers conservative accounting choices, therefore, the last year of discretionary 
accruals are expected to be income decreasing. Also, litigation risk will determine the 
auditor’s choice of discretionary accruals. Lastly, the incumbent auditor is more 
conservative than the average auditor; thus, discretionary accruals in the first year with 
the successor auditor will be less income decreasing than in the last year of the 
predecessor.  
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Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) focused on the debate of audit tenure and 
audit quality. In the case of short audit tenure, it is evident that auditors have less client-
specific knowledge in the early years of the engagement. Therefore, the auditors are less 
likely to detect a material misstatement. However, the lack of client-specific knowledge 
on an engagement can be overcome by committing more effort on new engagements. 
This requires more technology and resources that cannot be implemented immediately. 
The authors also suggest that long-term tenures also provide less quality audits since the 
auditor has other incentives to maintain and profit from the client, becoming less 
concerned with client litigation. The findings showed that most audit failures occur 
within the first three years of a new auditor-client relationship. It also showed that a five-
year tenure is more effective in detecting material misstatements than a twenty-year 
tenure. This theory encourages auditor switching as a necessary action during the lifetime 
of a company to ensure higher audit quality.  
A more recent study evaluated the association between the audit-firm tenure and 
audit fees paid to the successor auditors. Kealey, Lee and Stein (2007) asserted that after 
the sudden collapse of Arthur Anderson, a large number of companies made an 
involuntary auditor switch that affected the average tenure of auditor-client relationships. 
The results of the study found that firms with a longer tenure receive higher fees than 
new auditors.  
In recent years, there is more of a tendency for companies to switch auditors. In 
2004, more than 1,600 companies changed auditors, 61 of which changed auditors at least 
twice over a relatively short time frame (Lu, 2008). “Opinion shopping” is the “search for 
an auditor willing to support a particular accounting treatment designed to help a 
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company achieve its reporting objects” even though that treatment may not coincide with 
regular financial reporting. One concern for auditor switches is the resulting decline in 
reliability of reported financial statements due to a drop in audit quality. Another 
expressed concern is the expansion of management manipulation of financial statements 
due to this loss of audit quality.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Research has shown that there are adherents and critics of each theory for 
measuring audit quality. I have discussed the theories based on auditor reputation, auditor 
wealth, audit fees and auditor switching. The sample used in my research explores the 
ideas behind auditor switching but also supports the deep pockets theory in that auditor 
wealth increases the amount of criticism and litigation involving the auditor firm. This 
rivals the idea that the auditor’s reputation prevents an auditor from issuing poor quality 
reports in saying that there is more at risk than just reputation. A few studies have shown 
that audit fees can be an indicator of audit quality because the more an auditor is paid, the 
more work and quality the auditor will provide.  
 The focus of this paper has been on auditor switching after corporate fraud and 
the auditor’s failure to detect the fraud. Previous studies have found that companies that 
have received qualified opinions are more likely to switch auditors than those that receive 
clean opinions. While research has shown that litigation is not a good measure for audit 
quality, the companies that were included in my sample experienced corporate fraud that 
may indicate major audit failures and the required restatement of years of activity. When 
faced with decisions to switch auditors, most of the companies in my sample chose a 
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larger “name brand” auditor. The reputation of a Big-Four auditor signals credibility and 
creates more value for a company, in the eyes of shareholders, and auditor credibility 
might take on added importance immediately following the discovery of corporate fraud.  
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Table 1: Summary of Auditor Switches  
Date Description Previous 
Auditor 
New Auditor 
2006-9 Koss Corporation committed a $31 million fraud by the 
company’s VP of Finance for a period of 5 years. 
Grant Thornton Baker, Tilly 
Virchow 
Krause, LLP 
2003-5 DHB Industries Inc, committed an accounting disclosure fraud 
through its senior officers and misappropriated company assets 
to benefit the CEO 
Grant Thornton Weiser LLP 
2009 China Intelligent Lighting and Electronics Inc. (CIL) switched 
auditors because the previous auditor resigned and withdrew its 
audit opinions. 
MaloneBailey 
LLP 
Friedman LLP 
2007 The SEC found sixty-nine audit firms and partners that issued 
reports without being registered with the PCAOB.  
  
2002-3 City of San Diego issued unqualified audit reports when they 
contained materially false and misleading information about San 
Diego’s pension and retiree health care obligations 
Calderon, Jaham 
& Osborn 
Macias Gini & 
O’Connell LLP  
2004 American International Group, Inc. (AIG) was charged securities 
fraud by falsely inflating AIG’s loss reserves. 
Coopers & 
Lybrand (PwC) 
PwC LLP 
2001 KMart executives failed to acknowledge critical financial 
information in the Management Discussion and Analysis section 
of its 10-K 
PwC LLP PwC 
 
2000 Enterasys Network Systems, Inc. artificially inflated the price of 
its stock by incorrectly recognizing revenue for sales 
transactions.  
KPMG LLP KPMG LLP 
2000-2004 Delphi Corporation engaged in multiple schemes resulting 
materially misstating its financial condition 
Deloitte and 
Touche 
Ernst and 
Young 
1997- 2000 Xerox Corporation engaged in fraudulent schemes that misled 
investors about its earnings, accelerating the recognition of 
revenues of approximately $3 billion 
KPMG LLP PwC LLP 
2005 - 2009 Satayam Computer Services experienced massive accounting 
fraud that went undetected for several years 
PwC (PW India 
Affiliates) 
Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells 
2000-2003 Nortel Networks Limited (Nortel) made changes to its revenue 
recognition policies that fraudulently accelerated revenue to 
meet its revenue target 
Deloitte & 
Toche LLP 
KPMG LLP  
1998 Just For Feet, Inc. went bankrupt and the partners involved in the 
audit failed to perform the proper tests  
Deloitte KPMG LLP 
2000 Adelphia Communications Coproration perpetrated a massive 
fraud and the audit team failed to implement the proper tests to 
detect it 
Deloitte PwC 
2000-2004 Cardinal Health, Inc. engaged in a fraudulent revenue and 
earnings management scheme 
Deloitte Ernst & Young  
1994-2005 UnitedHealth Group CEO backdated stock options to seek the 
return of undeserved compensation 
Arthur Anderson Deloitte & 
Touche LLP 
1998-2002 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
improperly reported its earnings by using derivatives to shift 
earnings 
Arthur Anderson PwC 
1999-2002 Nicor, Inc. executives engaged in a financial fraud that 
misrepresented the inventory to reach certain financial targets  
Arthur Anderson Deloitte & 
Touche LLP 
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